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ENFORCING SECURITY INTERESTS IN CONSUMER
GOODS: SOME NOTES ON THE VICIOUS CYCLE
Richard E. Speidel*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), now effective everywhere
except Louisiana, is conspicuously neutral on consumer protection
issues, leaving these matters to other laws, if any, in the adopting state.-
In the past few years, considerable pressure for reform of the consumer
credit transaction has been manifested. One example of proposed re-
form is the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC), approved by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Bar Association, and recommended for adoption by
the several states.2 The UCCC, enacted with variations in six states3
*Doherty Professor of Law, University of Virginia. AJB., Denison University,
1954; J.D., University of Cincinnati, 1957; LL.M., Northwestern University, 1958.
While the author is a member of the Virginia Consumer Credit Study Commission, the
views expressed herein are his own and not those of the Commission or any of its
members.
I While acknowledging the presence of consumers (see UmNFoRm CoMME ICAL CODE
§ 2-302, 9-507(1), 9-109(1), 9-307(2) [hereinafter cited as UCC]) the UCC, with some
justification, avoids confronting most consumer protection issues. See, e.g., UCC §
9-201, 9-203(2), 9-206; Skilton & Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of Goods
Under the Uniform Conmmercial Code, 65 MicH. L. Ray. 1465, 1469-70 (1967).
2 The final draft of the UCCC, approved in the Summer of 1968, was revised slightly
in 1969 to conform to the federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-
77 (Supp. 1972); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 891-96 (Supp. 1972). See Roisman, Truth in Lending:
Regulation Z-Its Limitations and Applicability, 37 Go. WAsH. L. Rav. 1154 (1969).
sAs of September, 1972, states enacting the UCCC with effective date were: Okla-
homa (July 1, 1969); Utah (July 1, 1969); Idaho (July 1, 1971); Wyoming (July 1,
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and studied in many more, including Virginia,4 takes a cautious ap-
proach to the problems. A key assumption of the UCCC is that the
average consumer with adequate information is capable of making ra-
tional choices, and that market choice is an effective weapon with
which to combat excessive finance charges. Thus, the UCCC combines
required disclosure of finance charges with the easing of entry into
the credit market for more sellers and lenders in the hope that informed
shopping and the laws of supply and demand will keep the cost of
credit well below the generous ceilings that have been established. This
approach is supported by an effort to eliminate or control specific
creditor practices thought to be most abusive, to limit certain creditor
remedies, and to regulate the various forms of credit, property, and
liability insurance most frequently involved. The primary responsibil-
ity for enforcement rests with an administrator who has power to
investigate alleged violations, issue administrative enforcement orders,
seek injunctive relief and bring civil actions against creditors.5 On the
whole, the UCCC reflects a balanced approach to regulation in the
consumer credit market. Compared with the hodgepodge of Virginia
credit law,6 it is rationality personified.
1971); Indiana (October 1, 1971); and Colorado (October 1, 1971). 1 CCH CONsuMFa
CREDIT GUIDE t 4770.4 The study was conducted by the Consumer Credit Study Commission, created by
S. J. REs. No. 41, adopted at the 1970 Regular Session of the General Assembly of Vir-
ginia and a Subcommittee appointed by the Virginia Code Commission to implement
H. J. RES. No. 106, adopted at the 1970 Regular Session of the General Assembly, direct-
ing the Code Commission to undertake a study of the "desirability of adopting, in whole
or in part, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code." Both groups recommended against
adopting the UCCC at this time.
5 The UCCC applies, generally, to consumer credit sales and loans, defined as a sale or
loan made by a person regularly engaged in the business of selling or making loans in
which the buyer or debtor is a person other than an organization, the goods are pur-
chased or the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household or agricul-
tural purpose, either the debt is payable in instalments or a credit or loan service
charge is made and the amount financed or principal does not exceed $25,000. UNmORM
CONSUMER CREDrr CODE §§ 2.104(1) and 3.104(1) [hereinafter cited as UCCC]. For
expositions of the UCCC which are basically favorable, see Braucher, Consumer Credit
Reform: Rates, Profits and Competition, 43 TMvP. L.Q. 313 (1970); Jordan & Warren,
The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 387 (1968); Curran, Admin.-
istration and Enforcement Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 33 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROB. 737 (1968). Cf. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Re-
form, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1969).
6 Peters, Uniform Consumer Credit Code-A Prospect for Consumer Credit Reform
in Virginia, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 75 (1971). For similar studies in other states, see
Clark, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Assessing Its Impact upon One State and
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The UCCC, however, has received many critical if not hostile re-
views and faces an uncertain future. Criticism has come from those
regulated and those for whom the legislation was drafted, the consumer.
A casual survey of the literature reveals the range of criticism in-
volved,7 and that almost no one appears to be totally satisfied with the
final product." These undercurrents highlight the difficulty of develop-
ing reform legislation which will be both effective and likely to be
enacted into law.
The uncertain future of the UCCC is accentuated by events other
than critical reviews. A pending study by the New York Law Revision
Commission, the pressure for federal legislation,9 and the potential im-
pact of the Constitution of the United States' highlight the probable
evolution of the UCCC as a legislative package. But of utmost impor-
tance, the UCCC has an active rival in the National Consumer Act
Plugging Its Loopholes, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 277 (1970) (Kansas); Spanogle, Advantages
and Disadvantages-A Comparison of the Present Maine Law and the U3C, 22 AAINE
L. REv. 295 (1970).7 See, e.g., Harper, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: A Critical Analysis, 44
N.Y.U.L. REv. 53 (1969) (creditor viewpoint); James & Fragomen, The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles V & VI, 57 GEo. L.J. 923
(1969); Littlefield, The Plight of the Consumer in the Uniform Consumer Credit Code:
A 1971 Perspective, 48 DEN. L.J. 1 (1971); Murphy, Lawyers for the Poor View the
Uniform Consuemer Credit Code, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 298 (1969) (qualified support-
better than nothing); Willier, A Uniform Consumer Creditor's Code, 54 MAss. L.Q.
53, 61 (1969) (fundamentally inadequate).8 Paul Moo has suggested that the absence of any group completely "for" the UCCC
may be its "best endorsement." Moo, Commentary, 24 Bus. LAW. 223, 226 (1968).9 See, e.g., Felsenfeld, Competing State and Federal Roles in Consumer Credit Law,
45 N.Y.UJ.. REv. 487 (1970).0In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1969), a Wisconsin
statute permitting a creditor to obtain a pre-judgment garnishment of wages without
prior notice to or an opportunity for a hearing by the debtor was held to deny "due
process" under the 14th amendment to the Constitution. See Kennedy, Due Process
Limitations on Creditor's Remedies: Some Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 19 Am. U. L. REV. 158 (1970). Subsequent efforts by consumers to persuade
federal and state courts to extend Sniadach to the enforcement process in consumer
credit transactions met with mixed results. Clark, Default, Repossession, Foreclosure,
and Deficiency, A Journey to the Underworld and A Proposed Salvation, 51 ORE. L.
REv. 302, 322-331 (1972). In the cases which reached the Supreme Court in the Octo-
ber, 1971 Term, confession of judgment statutes in Ohio and Pennsylvania barely sur-
vived a constitutional attack (infra note 52) and a Florida replevin statute was held to
deny due process when used by a secured creditor to repossess personal property with-
out first giving the debtor notice and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of entitlement. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S.Ct. 1983 (1972).
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(NCA), the First Final Draft of which was recently issued by the
National Consumer Law Center.11
To say that the NCA marches to a different tune would be an
understatement. Viewing the problem from the perspective of the
consumer least able to protect himself, the NCA rejects many of the
market assumptions underlying the UCCC and is far more inclusive
in the scope of regulation. At each critical juncture, greater controls
are imposed upon creditor practices and remedies, more power is given
the Administrator, and a broader array of private remedies, individual
and collective, is provided. One commentator has suggested the NCA's
main fault may be its own "overzealousness."
In attempting to fortify the consumer against unscrupulous creditors,
it has put too many restrictions on the legitimate lender. The result
of such limitations might well be the discontinuance of consumer
loans by such institutions. 2
Reserving judgment on this argument for the moment, it seems clear
that the NCA provides an important pro-consumer philosophy for
evaluating current and proposed consumer credit laws. This philosophy,
simply stated, is that the force of regulation should be directed at those
creditors most prone to abuse various strategic, and economic bargain-
ing advantages to protect those consumers least capable of fending
for themselves in that setting. Whatever the impact upon the cost or
availability of credit, it must be absorbed by all consumers in the
interest of meaningful reform. Rejected is the notion that effective
protection from abuse can be achieved by compromise, by depend-
ence upon informed consumer choice in the credit market, or by
excessive reliance upon private remedies in courts to deter abusive
practices.' 3 In short, the minimum conditions for engaging in the
business of extending credit are higher and the penalties for deviation
are greater in the NCA than the UCCC.14
IlThe National Consumer Act (first final draft 1969) [hereinafter cited as NCA],
sponsored by the National Legal Aid and Defenders Association and the National Con-
sumer Law Center at Boston College Law School, was drafted in response to criticisms
of the UCCC. (As this article went to press, a "second" final draft of the NCA was in
preparation.) For a brief description of the background of the UCCC and the NCA,
see Comment, 12 B. C. IND. & COMM. L. REv. 889, 890-93 (1971).
12 Comment, supra note 11 at 915.
13 Rice, Remedies Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consunzer Transaction
Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559 (1968).
14 According to Lon L. Fuller, a primary task of law is to locate the point where the
(Vol. 7:187
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II. THE CYCLE IDENTIFIED
This apparent difference in regulatory philosophy prompts a more
particularized inquiry. Assume that a retailer has sold expensive goods
on credit to a consumer and has created and perfected under UCC
Article 9 a purchase money security interest in the goods sold and a
security interest in other household goods to secure the unpaid con-
tract price. The written security agreement spells out the acts or
omissions of the debtor which, in addition to non-payment, will con-
stitute default; contains an acceleration clause which permits the se-
,cured party, if default occurs or he deems himself insecure, to acl-
erate the monetary obligation and enforce the security interest; and
contains an agreement for the benefit of -any assignee of the monetary
obligation or security interest that the debtor will not assert defenses
good against the secured party against the assignee. These terms are
offered to the debtor on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. The debtor also
signs a negotiable installment note which contains, among other thifi&,
the acceleration clause and a term authoring the payee or his order
to confess judgment on the instrument if it is not paid when due.15
The security agreement and installment note together constitute chattel
paper; we may assume that the agreement has been assigned and the
note negotiated by the secured party to a third party bank or finance
company for value. 6
"morality of duty," i.e., the "basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible,
or without which an ordered society directed toward certain goals must fail," ends aid
the "morality of aspiration," i.e., where society leaves the individual free to pursue the"challenge of excellence," begins. 'Deciding where duty ought to leave off is one of
the most difficult tasks of social philosophy." L. FuLLER, THE MoaLrrn OF LAW 3-32
(1963). Without question, the legislative and judicial trend is to impose more "basic
rules" upon professional sellers and lenders as they deal with individual consumers in
credit transactions where the choice is, essentially, "take it or leave it." Some of the
reasons for and difficulties posed by this trend are discussed in the following articles:
Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 Aa. U. L. REv. 131 (1970); Slawson, Standard Form Con-
tracts and Democratic Control of Law Making, 84 I-Iav. L. REv. 529 (1971); Speidel,
Unionscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 359 (1970).'
1GThese terms do not affect the negotiability of the promissory note. UCC §§
3-109(1) (c), 3-112(1) (d).
16 Chattel paper is defined as a writing or group of writings which, taken together,
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods. The
security interest is created by a security agreement and the monetary obligation may
be evidenced by a negotiable instrument. UCC § 9-105(1) (b). Cf. UCC § 3-119. The
assignee of a perfected security interest succeeds to the status of the assignor. UCC
§1 9-302 (2), 9-405. The instrument is easily negotiated to the assignee, who may qualify
as a holder in due course. UCC §§ 3-202(1), 3-301, 3-302, 3-305. A consumer, who as
1972]
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A primary purpose of security is to permit the secured party, upon
default, to satisfy the underlying monetary obligation from the debtor's
property in which the security interest was created. If the proceeds
upon disposition of the collateral are inadequate to satisfy this obli-
gation, the secured party or his transferee has, traditionally, been able
to sue on the note and recover any deficiency. By establishing a reli-
able system of security, the legal system enables sellers and lenders to
extend credit in cases where business risks may dictate otherwise.
While never a substitute for sound evaluation practices, the fact of
security tends to expand rather than limit the extension of credit. 17
By permitting the secured party to assign the security interest and
negotiate the note for present, discounted value, and protecting the
transferee from certain defenses which may exist between the origi-
nal parties, the legal system also encourages banks and other lending
institutions to finance retail sellers. This, in turn, further supports the
extension of relatively low cost credit to consumers. All things being
equal, security and negotiability are important legal events in a healthy
credit economy.' 8
The health of an economy, however, may also be gauged by who
has what power and how it is exercised. Consider the power the se-
cured party or his transferee possesses upon default by the consumer.
Considerations of voluntary restraint aside, the remedies conferred
by the agreement and indorsed under traditional commercial law
permit certain actions to be taken without resort to legal processes.
First, relying on a broad definition of default in the security agree-
ment, the creditor may declare the debtor in default and accelerate
the monetary obligation without regard to the reason for default or
the possibility of extension or refinancing.
Second, the creditor can, by self-help, repossess the specific per-
sonal property in which the security interest has been created.
Third, after repossession the creditor may conduct a private sale of
the collateral, using the proceeds to defray various expenses and to
satisfy the basic obligation.
part of one transaction, signs both a negotiable instrument and a security agreement
makes an agreement not to assert defenses against the assignee. UCC § 9-206(1).
17 R. SPEIDEL, R. SummERs & J. WHii, CoMmERciAL TRANsACTONS: TEACHING MA-
TERIAS 84-85 (1969).
18But see Rosenthal, Negotiability-Who Needs It?, 71 COLum. L. REv. 375 (1971),
calling for a critical examination of the assumption that the concept of negotiability
helps the flow of commerce.
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Fourth, if and only if a deficiency exists after the resale, the creditor
may confess judgment on the note and take appropriate action through
garnishment or execution to reach other property of the debtor.
Fifth, whether enforcing the security interest or the note, the
creditor, if an assignee-holder, may claim immunity to defenses be-
tween the debtor and the original secured party and proceed to full
satisfaction.' 9
The striking feature of this cycle of default, acceleration, reposses-
sion, disposition, and deficiency is that the creditor's need to invoke
formally the aid of the legal system is minimized. To the creditor who
has slighted the credit investigation or tends toward irresponsibility,
the benefits in speed, efficiency, and economy through these non-judi-
cial remedies may be irresistible.2 0 If the consumer is unable or un-
willing to seek early legal protection against abuse in the cycle, his
valid defenses, if any, will first be assertable after the fact. In short,
the opportunity to defend on either the security agreement or the
note may first be available when the debtor is looking down the barrel
of an action for deficiency.
When remedial power of this sort is exercised with restraint, the
cycle described above becomes no worse than any other legal device
designed to protect businessmen against risk. When the power is
abused the cycle becomes vicious and difficult to justify on any
ground. Whether the power is abused and, if so, the proper controls
to be applied, are hard questions for which no adequate data now
exists. Nevertheless, based upon contrasting views on the probability
of abuse and the adequacy of current protection, the UCC, the UCCC,
and the NCA impose different legal controls upon creditors at vary-
ing stages of the cycle. A brief comparison of these statutes will de-
termine wherein the differences lie in protection afforded the con-
sumer.2 1
19For an objective discussion of the "cycle" prior to and after promulgation of the
UCC, see Hogan, The Secured Party and Default Proceedings Under the Uniform
Co mercial Code, 47 MiNN. L. REV. 205 (1962).
20 Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80 YALE
L.J. 1, 1-19, 22-24 (1970).
21 Along this same line, see Clark, supra note 10; Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and
the UCC-Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 LAW & CONTEu.
PaOB. 686, 692-704 (1968); Note, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code and Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 838 (1970); Comment, An Analysis
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code and the National Consumer Act, 12 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. REv. 889 (1971); Comment, Consusmer Protection Under the UCC and the
NCA-A Comparison and Recommendations, 12 ARIz. L. R~v. 572 (1970).
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III. THE CYCLE REGULATED: LEGAL CONTROLS AND REMEDIES UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE AND THE NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT.
In this section, the various steps of the cycle will be identified and
discussed with reference to the controls and remedies available to con-
sumers under the UCC, the UCCC, and the NCA. In the next sec-
tion, the differences noted will be evaluated against the difficulties of
consumer credit reform.
A. Definition of Default and Power to Accelerate
UCC. Under UCC 9-501 (1), the definition of default is a matter for
agreement and can best be described as being "whatever the security
agreement says it is." 2 Upon default, the acceleration clause usually
gives the secured party an option to accelerate the installment obligation
and enforce the security agreement z Pre-Code decisions in Virginia
and other states required the secured party to manifest by notice or
otherwise a decision to exercise the option, and permitted the debtor
to cure any default by tendering the past due amount before exercise
of the option.24 UCC 1-208 provides that an option to accelerate when
the creditor "deems himself insecure" shall be "construed to mean that
he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment... is impaired." The burden of establishing bad
222 GiLMORE, SECURITY INTEREsTs IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 43.3 (1965). See Whisen-
hunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga. App. 813, 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969) (in absence of agree-
ment specifying events, default occurs only when debtor fails to pay on time).
23 In the absence of an acceleration clause, UCC § 2-709 may not support an action
for more than the particular installment due, even though the buyer has repudiated.
R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES § 178, n.52 (1970).
24Florence v. Friedlander, 209 Va. 520, 165 S.E.2d 388 (1969) (where notice of
acceleration and tender of payment are simultaneous, conflict resolved in favor of
debtor). Accord, United States v. Myers, 308 F. Supp. 859 (D. Md. 1970); Grozier v.
Post Publishing Co., 342 Mass. 97, 172 N.E.2d 266 (1961); Peter Fuller Enter., Inc. v.
Manchester Say. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 152 A.2d 179 (1959). But see Baader v. Walker,
153 So. 2d 51 (Fla. App. 1963) (acceleration automatic upon default). If the option has
been exercised properly, foreclosure may still be blocked if the debtor redeems by
tendering the entire amount due, United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Holman, 177 Neb.
682, 130 N.W.2d 593 (1964), or the default is waived when the creditor accepts a part
payment, Trudeau v. Lussier, 123 Vt. 358, 189 A.2d 529 (1963). An acceleration clause
may be treated as a penalty provision if the creditor seeks to recover a substantial
amount of unearned interest, A-Z Servicenter v. Segall, 334 Mass. 672, 138 N.E.2d 266
(1956), and denied effect if the default was caused by the creditor's unconscionable or
inequitable conduct. See Jacobson v. McClanahan, 43 Wash. 2d 751, 264 P.2d 253, 5
A.L.R.2d 968 (1953).
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faith is "on the party against whom the power has been exercised." 25
Thus, the UCC authorizes a direct attack upon the exercised "deemed
insecure" option, and a recent decision has extended the good faith
duty to an option exercised after the consumer actually had missed one
or more payments.26 The attack, however, will invariably be made in
court after the cycle is well underway.
UCCC. There is no attempt to define default in the UCCC, nor are
there explicit limitations imposed upon agreements which define default
or permit acceleration. Under UCCC 6.111 (1) (a), however, the Ad-
ministrator is authorized to seek injunctions against creditors who
engage in a "course of ... making or enforcing unconscionable terms
or provisions of consumer credit sales." The section states that a rele-
vant factor is whether the creditor believed at the time of the sale "that
there was no reasonable probability of payment in full of the obliga-
tion of the debtor." 27 Thus, the practice of extending credit to con-
sumers likely to default under agreements broadly defining default
and containing acceleration clauses might be enjoinable by the Ad-
ministrator.
NCA. NCA 5.103 (2) provides that "no cause of action shall accrue
in favor of the creditor with respect to the obligation of the con-
sumer except by reason of his default as defined." Default is defined as
a substantial unjustified failure to pay, such as the failure to make "three
successive installments within the period of time allowed by this Act." 28
25For a good discussion of when UCC 1-208 applies, the definition of good faith,
and difficulties created by placing the burden of proof on the debtor, see Comment,
Acceleration Clauses in Sales and Secured Transactions: The Debtor's Burden Under
Section 1-208 of the U.C.C., 11 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 531 (1970). See also Klingbiel
v. Commercial Credit Corp., 439 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1971) ("deemed insecure" accelera-
tion clause construed to require notice and demand as condition precedent to reposses-
sion).
26 Urdang v. Muse, 114 NJ. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397 (1971) (exercise of option to
accelerate, repossess, and sell car not in good faith where debtor, after repossession,
tendered amount far in excess of amount due but not enough fully to satisfy outstand-
ing obligation). Cf. Margolin v. Franklin, 270 N.E.2d 140 (IMI. App. 1971) (default
waived by secured party).
27 UCCC § 6.111(3) (a). The injunction will be issued only if the court finds that the
"respondent has made unconscionable agreements or has engaged or is likely to engage
in a course of unconscionable conduct" or that the "agreements or conduct has caused
or is likely to cause injury to consumers." UCCC § 6.111(2). The "private" uncon-
scionability defense, based upon UCC § 2-302, makes no effort to spell out factors
relevant to the determination. UCCC § 5.108. Cf. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (sale of expensive stereo to woman on relief, coupled
with "add-on" clause, may be unconscionable).
28NCA § 5.103 (1) (a).
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Thus, the creditor in good faith cannot initiate the cycle by relying
upon the "deemed insecure" language of an acceleration clause or upon
insubstantial acts of default.
B. Property in Which Security Interest May be Created
UCC. Upon default, the secured party may enforce a security in-
terest created in any personal property of the consumer, whether it
be the goods sold or other household items. UCC 9-204(3) provides
that a "security agreement may provide that collateral, whenever ac-
quired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement."
However, when consumer goods other than accessions are given as
additional security, UCC 9-204(4) (b) provides that an after-acquired
security interest will not attach "unless the debtor acquires rights in
them within ten days after the secured party gives value."
UCCC. UCCC 2.408 (1) provides that a seller who creates a purchase
money security interest in goods sold may not create an additional
security interest in other goods of the buyer to secure the primary obli-
gation unless "as a result of a prior sale the seller has an existing security
interest in the other property." Therefore, unless a cross-collateral
arrangement exists, the security interest in additional household goods
is void.2
NCA. Except for the property sold, NCA 2.416 states that "no
security interest other than a purchase money security interest may be
taken in household furnishings, appliances and clothing of the con-
sumer and his dependents." Cross-collateral arrangements, permitted
by the UCC and UCCC, are prohibited unless two or more transactions,
each with a valid security interest, are consolidated into one obligation. °
C. Method of Repossession
UCC. Upon default by a consumer, a secured party may decide to
enforce a valid security interest by repossessing the described collateral,
either through legal processes, such as replevin (or detinue in Vir-
ginia31), or by self-help. Under UCC 9-503 a secured party, unless
29 UCCC § 2A07(3). In a valid cross-collateral arrangement, payments received by the
seller are "deemed, for the purpose of determining the amount of the debt secured by
the various security interests, to have been first applied to the payment of the debts
arising from the sales first made." UCCC § 2A09(1).
80NCA § 2.417(1). See NCA § 2.207(1) (when consolidation is proper).
51When using the judicial process to implement his right to possession under UCC
§ 9-503, the Virginia secured party must proceed in detinue under VA. CODE ANN. §§
[Vol. 7:187
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otherwise agreed, has the "right to take possession of the collateral ...
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace." Definition of "breach of the peace" is left by the UCC to the
courts. While various courts have struggled to develop a standard for
control, it seems clear that the secured party has considerable maneu-
vering room short of actual resistance by the debtor or forcible entry
into a dwelling.32 One may question whether this control is sufficient
to deter the skillful and determined repossessor.
UCCC. The UCCC is silent on methods of repossession, leaving the
matter to UCC 9-503.
NCA. The NCA's First Final Draft imposes substantial restrictions
upon the method of repossession. Except where the collateral is volun-
tarily surrendered, NCA 5.204 prohibits self-help or non-judicial repos-
8-585 through 8-595 (1957). Replevin is not available. A number of problems are posed
by this action. First, it is harder to recover the property in detinue than in replevin,
since the secured party must establish, in addition to default and an enforceable security
interest, that the debtor is insolvent or that the collateral is about to be sold or materially
injured. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-586 (1957). Cf. Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 440 Pa. 583, 271 A.2d 493 (1970). Second, the debtor can, after possession
has been taken by the public official, regain the property upon posting a bond. VA.
CoDE Am. § 8-588 (1957). This could block a private or public disposition under
UCC § 9-504(3). Third, the debtor can contest the secured party's right to possession
in court, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-591 (1957), and, even if unsuccessful, is given the "election
of paying the amount of such judgment or surrendering the specific property" VA.
CoDE ANN. § 8-593 (1957). While this seems to preclude, in some cases, the right to a
deficiency judgment provided in UCC § 9-504(2), the secured party's fear is lessened
by a general statement in VA. CODE ANN. § 8-593 (1957) that any inconsistency between
"this section and any applicable provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code" shall be governed by the UCC. Finally, under Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 10,
use of detinue would deny due process if the debtor's property was taken without prior
notice and a hearing on entitlement. See 23 Op. AT'Y GEN. oF ViRGINIA 54 (Oct. 18,
1972). From the author's viewpoint, a more inappropriate statutory procedure for re-
possession under Article 9 cannot be imagined.
32 See, e.g., Morris v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co, 21 Ohio St. 2d 25, 254 NE.2d 683
(1970) (peace breached where creditor takes property from private premises after
confrontation with owner's representative who issued order to stop); Renaire Corp.
v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1958) (under Virginia law, forcible entry
into dwelling house while owner away breaches peace, even though entry authorized
by security agreement); Universal Credit Co. v. Taylor, 164 Va. 624, 180 SE. 277, 280
(1935) (creditor must resort to legal process when right to repossession is "denied or
resisted by another.") See also Gilmer, The Debtor's Duty Under UCC 9-503 to
Deliver Collateral Upon Default, 53 MARQ. L. REv. 33 (1970); White, Representing the
Low Income Consumzer in Repossessions, Resales and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64
Nw. U.L. REv. 808, 809-17 (1970).
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session.3 A judicial process is created in which the secured party must
file a repossession complaint. The consumer is then entitled to an
expedited hearing on such matters as whether a default has occurred or
defenses exist before process can issue with regard to the collateral. 4
Thus, the cycle can be blocked by what emerges from hearing proce-
dures governed by rudimentary due process35-a hoop through which
the secured party must jump in order to repossess the collateral.
D. Cure, Refinancing, and Redemption
To what extent can a consumer in default unilaterally block the
cycle by agreeing to refinance or tendering an amount of money suffi'
cient to "cure" the default or pay off the obligation?
UCC. Under UCC 9-506 the debtor may redeem the collateral at
any time before disposition "by tendering fulfillment of all obligations
secured by the collateral," plus the secured party's reasonable expenses
incurred in enforcement, and reasonable attorney's fees. 36 Efforts to
33 NCA § 5.202. Voluntary is not defined.
84NCA §§ 5.206 and 5.208.
n In the first final draft, it was stated that "the decision of the United States, Supreme
Court in Sniadach [supra note 10] . . . can be interpreted as holding there mist be a
preliminary hearing wherein the probable validity of the underlying claim must be
established before the defendant can be deprived of his property interests," NCA
5.208, comment. A substantial retreat from this position is reflected in a new section,
5.112, proposed in December, 1970. This section expressly permits repossession without
judicial process "if possession can be taken without entry into a dwelling and without
the use of force or other breach of the peace." Thus, a secured creditor under the
revised NCA could use "self-help" or resort to the legal process, subject, of course,
to the due process requirements of Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 10. The recently
enacted Wisconsin Consumer Act, effective March 1, 1973, is consistent with the NCA
"first" final draft-an action to recover collateral which fully complies with due process
is prescribed with sharply limited self-help exceptions. State of Wisconsin, 1971
Assembly Bill 1057, §§ 425.203 through 425.207.
Would a peaceful, self-help repossession which was authorized by the security agree-
ment and UCC 9-503 deny. due process? Compare Adams v. Egley, 338 F.Supp. 614
(S.D. Cal. 1972) (yes) 'with Oller v. Bank of America, - F.Supp. -, 10 U.C.C. Rep.
Ser. 877 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (no state action). For a strong hint that a contractual waiver
of due process rights is valid if "voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly" made but
that this is not likely to occur in a "contract of adhesion", see Fuentes v. Shevin, 92
S.Ct. 1983, 2001-02 (1972).36The redemption right may be waived by agreement only after default. UCC
§§ 9-501(3), 9-506. See Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Karlen, 28 N.Y.2d 30, 268
N.E.2d 632 (1971). An inadequate notice by the Secured Party of the intention to dis-
pose of the collateral under UCC § 9-504(3) may prevent exercise of the redemption
right and entitle the debtor to remedies under UCC § 9-507(l). See Braswell v.
American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968).
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;'cure" the default or refinance, however, must be agreed to by the
secured party.37  ",
UCCC. While UCCC 2.209 and 2.309 permit the consumer to
"prepay in full the unpaid balance ... at any time without penalty,"
and contain elaborate provisions on rebates, refinancing, consolidation
and delinquency and deferral charges,3 post-default adjustments short
of payment in full depend upon consent by the secured party-he must
be persuaded to forbear in continuing the cycle.
NCA. There are three distinct ways in which the consumer may
unilaterally block the cycle. First, where the consumer is not in default
but has failed to make an installment payment within ten days after
its due date, NCA 2.203 (2) requires the creditor to mail promptly a
written notice informing the consumer (1) of the delinquency, (2)
that a delinquency charge will be imposed if previously agreed, and
(3) that he may elect either to enter into a deferral agreement, refinance
'the unpaid balance, or consolidate the unpaid balance.32 The consumer
.may unilaterally block the cycle by any election and the creditor "has
no choice in the matter." 40 If minor delinquency ripens into default
without an election, a second device is available to the consumer. With-
in fifteen days after a complaint seeking repossession has been served,
he may still cure the default by "tendering fulfillment of his current
obligation to the creditor," i.e., the aggregate of all installments due at
the time of the tender, plus any unpaid delinquency or deferred
charges.41 If the default is not cured before process issues, the consumer,srill has thirty days within which to redeem the collateral by tendering
his current obligation, "together with the court costs incurred by the
creditor, and a performance deposit, not to exceed the total of three
installments, equal to one-third of the total obligation remaining with
respect to the consumer credit transaction." 42 Unless the consumer
exercises the option to prepay the entire obligation, each of the three
devices, election, cure, and redemption, maintains the credit transaction
37 A tender sufficient to cure the default before the option to accelerate is exercised,
however, is effective. See note 24 supra. Cf. UCC § 2-508.88See, e.g., UCCC §§ 2.203 through 2.206, and 2.210.
S9 NCA § 2.203 (1).
4o NCA § 2.203, comment 2.
41 NCA § 5.207.
42NCA § 5.209(1). Upon redemption, "the process under which the collateral has
been held shall be dissolved, the action shall be dismissed, and the goods shall be re-
turned." NCA § 5.209(2).
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at essentially the same point that existed before the delinquency or
default.
E. Method of Disposition and Entitlement to Deficiency
UCC. Upon repossession of consumer goods, a secured party has two
basic choices: (1) keep the collateral in full satisfaction of the obliga-
tion without a duty to account for any surplus, 48 or (2) dispose of the
collateral by public or private sale and sue the debtor on the under-
lying obligation for any deficiency. Under UCC 9-505 (1), however,
the first choice is not available if a purchase money security interest
has been created, and the debtor has paid sixty percent of the cash
price and has not waived his rights after default-the secured party
must dispose of the goods under 9-504 within ninety days after pos-
session is taken. If disposition is required or elected, the debtor is
entitled, with some exceptions, to "reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after
which any private sale ...is to be made." Under 9-504(3), "every
aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place and
terms, must be commercially reasonable." 41 Failure to comply with
these requirements will normally not affect the rights of a purchaser
for value in the disposition 4 but may, under a developing line of cases,
preclude the secured party from recovering any deficiency 7
43 The "strict foreclosure" option is conditioned upon notice to and lack of objection
from specified secured parties and the debtor. UCC § 9-502(2).
44The proper allocation of proceeds upon disposition is established in UCC § 9-504(1)
and the liability of the debtor for any deficiency is preserved in UCC 9-504(2). It has
been stated that the "intent of the Code was to broaden the options open to a creditor
after default rather than to limit them under the old theory of election of remedies."
Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 29 Mich. App. 99, 185 N.W.2d 47, 51 (1970).
45 For a full discussion of the problems in this area, see White, supra note 32, at 817-
25. With regard to notice in the case of consumer goods, the Permanent Editorial
Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has recommended amendments to UCC
§§ 9-501(3) and 9-504(3) permitting the debtor to sign "after default a statement
renouncing or modifying his right to notification of sale." The 1962 version, while
providing that notice need only be sent to the debtor where consumer goods were
involved, did not authorize post-default agreements. See PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo~a
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN ARTICLE 9 OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND RELATED CHANGES IN OTHER ARTIcTLs 57, 60 (December
20, 1971).
46 Under UCC § 9-504(4), a purchaser at a private sale who acts in good faith, "takes
free of all ... rights and interests even though the secured party fails to comply
with the requirements ... [of UCC § 9-504(3)]"
47 Despite the argument that UCC § 9-507(1) limits the debtor's remedies to pre-
disposition restraint and post-disposition damages for failures of the secured party to
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UCCC. Under the UCCC the cash price of the goods sold is critical.If the cash price is more than $1,000, the secured party may, upon
default, repossess, dispose of the goods, and sue for any deficiency under
Article 9, Part 5 of the UCC. If the cash price is $1,000 or less, the
secured party is required to choose between two inconsistent options:
(a) repossess the collateral, whereupon he is not entitled to any defi-
ciency but may retain the collateral in full satisfaction of the obligation;
or (b) sue for the full amount due on the installment note, whereupon
he may not repossess the collateral or subject it to "levy or sale on exe-
cution... pursuant to the judgment." 48
NCA. Here the amount of the unpaid balance at the time of default
is critical. If that amount is $2,000 or more, the secured party may
elect between enforcing the installment note or taking possession of the
collateral. Two consequences flow from the election to take possession:
(a) under NCA 5.210, the secured party shall "take all rights and
interests in the collateral" without any duty to dispose of it by sale or
otherwise, and (b) the secured party is entitled to any deficiency
measured by deducting the fair market value of the collateral from
the unpaid balance due. 9 If the unpaid balance is less than $2,000,
the secured party may still choose between enforcing the installment
note and taking possession of the collateral. If the latter option is
exercised, however, he must keep the collateral in full satisfaction of
the obligation and is not entitled to any deficiencyr 0
F. Enforcing the Installment Note
UCC. The UCC is silent on the rights and procedures involved
when a secured party seeks to enforce an installment note to recover
comply with Article 9, part 5, recent decisions have denied deficiency liability where
the resale under UCC § 9-504(3) was defective, see e.g., In re Bro Cliff, Inc., 8 UCC
Rep. Ser. 1144 (W.D. Mich. 1971); In Re Rouse, 8 UCC Rep. Ser. 578 (E.D. Tenn.
1970). See Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J. Super. 382, 276 A.2d 402 (1971)
(where notice is defective burden on secured party to prove that resale produced fair
value which was applied to debt); White, supra note 32, at 828-34.
48 UCCC § 5.103(2). The student critics have been harsh with this approach. Note,
65 Nw. J.L. Ray. 838 (1970); Note, 2 CoNN. L. Rav. 202 (1969).
49 NCA § 5.212(1).
GONCA §§ 5.211(1) and 5.210. The use of "unpaid balance" rather than the UCCC
"cash price" is justified by the drafters in terms of equity: the creditors who need
protection are those selling "big ticke" items or making large loans and who must
deal with default early in the payment schedule.
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a balance due or an allowable deficiency.5' In Virginia, the holder of
the note may confess judgment against the maker if the statutory
form requirements are met52 and have a garnishment summons issued,
subject to recent limitations imposed by the General Assembly to con-
form with federal lawY3 The debtor is entitled to notice of judgment
within ten days after entry and may, by a motion alleging a defense
made within twenty-one days after receiving notice, set aside the con-
fessed judgment and have the case set for trial44 These procedures
and the usual creditor's remedies in obtaining satisfaction apply whether
or not the debtor is a consumer.
UCCC. The UCCC invalidates an authorization by the debtor to"any person to confess judgment," 55 prohibits the pre-judgment gar-
nishment of unpaid earnings,"6 severely limits post-judgment garnish.-
ment,57 and regulates the amount of legal fees that can be recovered
as part of the debtor's agreement.58
NCA. The NCA also prohibits the confession of judgment and pre-
51 The procedural advantages from suing on an instrument are stated in UCC § 3-307.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-509 (1957).
52A confession of judgment, or warrant, made part of a note need not be acknowl-
edged but "shall specifically name therein the attorney or attorneys or other person
or persons authorized to confess such judgment and the clerk's office in which the
judgment is to be confessed." VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-359 (1957). This procedure, while
not unconstitutional on its face, does not foreclose a constitutional objection based
upon the lack of informed assent. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. 405 U.S. 174
(1972); Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) (confession of judgment statutes per-
mitting informed assent not invalid on face; effect contrace adhesion not resolved).
The confession of judgment is prohibited in transactions subject to the Small Loan
Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-283 (1966).
6 See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (1970) (maximum portion of disposable earnings sub-
ject to garnishment).
54 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-362, 8-357 (Cum. Supp. 1972). The confessed judgment will
not be a lien against the debtor's principal residence until the 21 day period has elapsed.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-358 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
55 UCCC §§ 2.415, 3.407.5o UCCC § 5.104.
57 UCCC § 5.105. See Comment, Garnishment Under the Cons-umer Credit Protection
Act and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 38 U. CrNN. L. Rv. 338 (1969).
5 8 In supervised loans where the debt is $1,000 or less, the lender cannot require the
debtor to pay any of the attorney's fees necessary to collect the debt. UCCC § 3.514. In
other consumer transactions, alternatives are provided for adopting states. Alternative
A prohibits agreements requiring debtors to pay attorney's fees and Alternative B per-
mits such agreements to the extent of 15% of the unpaid debt. UCCC §§ 2.413, 3.404.
In Virginia, an agreement requiring the debtor to pay reasonable attorney's fees if
collection is necessary is enforceable. See, e.g, Parksley Nat'l Bank v. Accomac Banking
Co., 166 Va. 459, 186 S.E. 38 (1936).
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judgment attachment 9 and, additionally, provides special procedures for
venue, pleading, and stay of enforcement. 60 It also exempts a wide
range of consumer property from levy, execution, and sale. Included
in this exempt property are unpaid wages,61 thereby prohibiting wage
garnishment as a method of realization.
G. Defenses Available Against Assignee or Holder of Instrument
UCC. When sued on an installment note, the consumer-maker may
attempt to set up defenses arising from the transaction with the secured
'party-seller, such-as breach of warranty, fraud, failure of consideration,
usury, and the like. These defenses, if established, are valid against that
secured party. If, however, the instrument has been negotiated to a
holder in due course, or an assignee of chattel paper is protected by
the consumer's agreement not to assert defenses, the defenses may not
be set up under the UCC.6 2 Put another way, the holder-assignee is
protected in enforcing both the note and the security interest, unless the
consumer has "real" defenses.6 3 Virginia embraces. this traditional view
and there is no evidence of a judicial trend' toward narrowing the
holder-in-due course doctrine, developing a "close relationship" test,
or invalidating agreements not to assert defenses.
59NCA § 2.404 (confession of judgment), 5.105 (pre-judgment attachment).
So NCA § 5.104.
0iNCA § 5.106(1) (a). NCA § 2.410(1) provides that "no term of a writing may
provide for the payment by the consumer of attorney's fees" anc that violations ard
subject to penalties, i.e., "twenty percent of the transaction total . . . or $200, whichever
is greater." NCA §§ 2.410(2), 5.303.62 See UCC §§ 3-302 through 305, 9-206. An example of hardline application in a
consumer transaction is Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Ingel, 347 Mass. 119, 196,
NE.2d 847 (1964). For a good discussion, see Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of
Conswner Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 U. So. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966);
Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48 N.CL. REv. 505 (1970);
Comment, Unico v. Owen: Consumer Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course
Under the UCC, 54 VA. L. REv. 279 (1968). Cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-304(7) (1965)
(special definition of notice).
63UCC § 3-305(2) (infancy, defects making obligation a nullity, misrepresentation
inducing signing of instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or essential terms).
64 Recent cases, reinforced by concern for the consumer, have used several approaches
to increase protection without the need for new legislation. One approach has been
to find that the payee of the note and the party to whom it was negotiated are so
closely related in an ongoing business relationship that the holder must be treated as if
he dealt with the consumer and was, therefore, subject to defenses. See, e.g., Unico v.
Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967); Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp., 256 A.2d
739 (Del. 1969). Cf. UCC § 3-305(2) (holder not free from defenses of party with
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UCCC. The UCCC limits the scope of this third party protection
with provisions which are both complicated and controversial.6 UCCC
2.403 states that a seller in a consumer credit sale "may not take a
negotiable instrument other than a check as evidence of the obligation
of the buyer." However, if a seller takes a negotiable instrument in
violation of this provision and negotiates it to a holder in due course
who has no knowledge of the violation, the consumer's defenses may
not be raised. Alternate A to UCCC 2.404 invalidates agreements not
to assert defenses and provides that consumer defenses can be asserted
as a matter of setoff against claims by the assignee and cannot exceed
the amount owing to the assignee at the time. Alternate B to UCCC
2.404, a compromise position, states that an agreement not to assert de-
fenses is enforceable "only by an assignor not related to the seller...
who acquires the buyer's contract in good faith and for value, who gives
the buyer ... notice of the assignment ... and who, within 3 months
after the mailing of the notice of assignment, receives no written notice
of the facts giving rise to the buyer's claim or defense." Even so, the
defense must have arisen "before the end of the three-month period
after notice was mailed." The balance of Alternative B deals with the
whom he has dealt). Another approach has been to engage in expansive or sympathetic
interpretations of the applicable UCC provisions. See General Investment Corp. v.
Angelini, 58 N.J. 396, 278 A.2d 193 (1971) (good faith requires inquiry when circum-
stances raise doubt about whether work was completed). Other courts have invalidated
waiver of defense clauses, see e.g., Fairfield Credit Corp. v. Donnelly, 158 Conn. 543,
264 A.2d 547 (1969), or made it clear that once a consumer has raised a defense in an
action on the note, the burden is on the holder to prove that he is in due course.
Geiger Finance Co. v. Graham, 123 Ga. App. 771, 182 S.E.2d 521 (1971). Beneath these
trends lurks the view that the holder rather than the consumer is in the best position
to assess and protect against the payee's default and that "[i]f any hardship results
from the rule we adopt, it is only that hardship inherent in the insistence of the law
that honesty and enterprise must remain compatible." Vasquez v. Superior Court,
4 Cal. 3d 800, 825, 484 P.2d 964, 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. 746, 812 (1971). For interesting com-
ments on the Vasquez case, see Symposium, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1041-99 (1971).
65 A bone of contention has been a supposed "loophole" in the UCCC, i.e., that a seller
can arrange for a buyer on credit to obtain a direct loan from a bank or other financing
institution to pay the price, leaving the buyer obligated on a note to a payee who is
neither the seller nor the holder of a note negotiated by the seller. Compare Littlefield,
Preserving Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 272 (1969), with Miller, Alternative Response to the Supposed Direct Loan Loop-
bole in the UCCC, 24 OKA. L. REv. 427 (1971). For a favorable report on the UCCC
provisions, see Murphy, Another "Assault Upon the Citadel:" Limiting the Use of
Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 Omio ST. L.J.
667 (1968).
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quality of notice, a definition of good faith, and limitation on the
amount to be set off.66
NCA. In a move that by this time should surprise no one, NCA
2.405 flatly prohibits all negotiable instruments in consumer credit
transactions, making it clear that no holder of any consumer obligation
can take free of defenses. With equal certitude, NCA 2.407 provides
that notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, "an assignee of
the rights of the creditor is subject to all claims and defenses of the
consumer, up to the amount of the transaction total." 17
H. Remedies
As in the scope of control over the cycle, sharp differences exist
between the UCC, the UCCC, and the NCA concerning the nature
and quantum of remedies available.03
UCC. Since there is no administrative system established to imple-
ment the UCC, consumers must rely upon private remedies when abuses
in the cycle occur.69 The key provision, UCC 9-507(1), spells out
two basic remedies: (a) where it is established "that the secured party
is not proceeding in accordance with this part disposition may be
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms and conditions," and (b)
where a disposition has occurred which fails to comply with "the
provisions of the part," the debtor may recover from the secured party"any loss caused." If the collateral is consumer goods, the "debtor has
a right to recover in any event an amount not less than the credit
G0 An assignee does not acquire a buyer's ... contract in good faith . . . if the
assignee has knowledge or, from his course of dealing with the seller ... or his
records, notice of substantial complaints by other buyers .. . of the seller's ...
failure or refusal to perform his contracts with them and of the seller's . . .
failure to remedy his defaults within a reasonable time after the assignee notifies
him of the complaint. UCCC § 4.404(2), Alternative B.
07 In short, the NCA's answer to Professor Rosenthal's question, "Negotiability-Who
Needs It?" is: "No one," in the consumer credit transaction. See note 20 supra.
68 One of the best discussions of the overall problem is Rice, Remedies, Enforcement
Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559
(1968). While there is some support for the UCCC remedial package, see, e.g., Curran,
Administration and Enforcement Under the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 33 LAW
& GorMIP. PROB. 737 (1968), telling criticisms have been made. See, e.g., James &
Fragomen, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Inadequate Remedies Under Articles
V& VI, 57 Gao. L.J. 923 (1969).
69 But see Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 647-50 (1971), where the
attorney general was permitted, under other consumer protection legislation, to sue on
behalf of defrauded consumers and attack unconscionable business practices under
UCC § 2-302.
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service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the debt or
the time price differential plus ten percent of the cash price." Thus,
the consumer could seek to restrain the cycle before disposition but the
probabilities are that he will be seeking damages by way of response
to the secured party's suit for a deficiency. As previously noted, some
courts have held that a failure to comply with Article 9, Part 5 pre-
cludes a deficiency judgment and, in an appropriate case, may entitle
the consumer to punitive damages.7 °
UCCC & NCA. While both the UCCC and NCA feature a mix of
public and private remedies, including criminal sanctions where viola-
tions are wilful,71 important differences exist where the cycle is con-
cerned. First, the NCA purports to regulate more steps of the cycle
than does the UCCC. Thus, those areas not covered by the UCCC,
such as default definition and the method of repossession and disposi-
tion, are left to private remedies under the UCC. Second, there are
differences of substance in the available public and private remedies.
A few examples will suffice.
Under NCA 6.106(1) the Administrator may investigate when he
has "reason to believe" that a person has engaged in an act subject to
action, while the UCCC Administrator under UCCC 6.106(1) must
have "probable cause." Under NCA 6.109, the Administrator "shall
promulgate rules and regulations declaring specific practices .. .to be
unconscionable and prohibiting the use thereof." The UCCC Adminis-
trator has no such power. In addition, the NCA Administrator has
broader power to seek injunctive relief against violations and may, in
a class action, seek the relief to which class members would be entitled
under the NCA.72
With regard to private remedies, both acts state numerous situations
where creditor action is prohibited, unenforceable, or void. Where
the cycle is involved, however, private affirmative remedies under the
UCCC are sparse indeed; penalties are strictly limited 73 and no class
70 See note 47 supra.
71 UCCC §§ 5.301, 5.302 (limited to impropriety in making of loans or disclosure vio-
lations); NCA §§ 5.401, 5.402 (includes disclosure violations and "any person who will-
fully engages in any conduct or proctice in violation of this Act"). Under both statutes,
the violations are misdemeanors.
72NCA § 6.111(1). Under UCCC 5 6.113, the Administrator may bring a civil
action relating to transactions with more than one debtor "against a creditor for making
or collecting charges in excess of those permitted by this Act." This is as close as the
UCCC comes to a class action.
73With regard to the cycle, if the seller has violated the limitation imposed upon
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action is permitted.74 Under the more comprehensive NCA, however,
the remedial objectives of compensation and deterrence are blended
into a potentially explosive package; an aggrieved consumer may, in
an individual or class action, recover penalties varying in amount with
the nature of the violation75 and reasonable attorney fees if he prevails.76
In addition, the consumer may bring a civil action to restrain, perma-
nently or temporarily, violations of the act.7  Finally, the effect of
void terms or transactions is spelled out with provision for the con-
sumer, when the transaction is void, both to retain what he has received
without obligation and to recover "any sums paid to the creditor ...
pursuant to the transaction." 78
IV. SoME NOTES UPON THE METHODOLOGY OF REFORM
To summarize, enactment of the NCA would accomplish the fol-
lowing objectives. First, by defining default as a material non-payment
and guaranteeing consumers opportunities to cure and refinance, the
NCA requires the creditor restraint which is reputed to occur as a
matter of good business practice.79 Regardless of the quality of the
initial credit decision, the creditor must take that "extra" step in ex-
the taking of a negotiable instrument, UCCC § 2.403, the debtor is not obligated to pay
any credit service charge and may recover "a penalty in an amount determined by the
court not in excess of three times the amount of the credit service charge or loan
service charge." UCCC § 5.502(1). Except for potential civil penalty liability to the
Administrator for willful violations of the UCCC, see UCCC § 6.113(2), this is the only
penalty provision available to a debtor abused in the cycle.
74 This decision is defended in Freese, Legislative Overview of the Uniform Con-
swner Credit Code: A 1971 Perspective, 48 DEN. L.J. 27, 37-43 (1971). See also, Starr,
Class Actions, 49 B.U.L. Rev. 211, 407 (1969); Note, 18 U.C.L.Al. Rev. 1002 (1971).
7r See NCA §§ 6.111(1) and 5.308 (class actions); 5.302-5.304 (penalties for certain
violations); 7.303 (punitive damages for violations of debt collection controls in Article
7, part 2). See Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IowA L. REv.
307 (1969).
76NCA § 5.307(1).
77 NCA § 6.110.
78 NCA § 5.305.
79 As stated in a recent decision:
For those who make an earnest effort to maintain their payment schedules and
default due to circumstances beyond their control, creditors have traditionally
exercised considerable flexibility and have exhausted every reasonable alternative
before resorting to the drastic and expensive remedy of repossession. Adams v.
Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
See Gifford, ThU Debtor's Default Under Article 9 -of the UCC: With Suggestions for
Draftsmen, 19 ALA. L. REv. 41 (1966), where it is stated that creditors will not lend
if default by the consumer seems likely.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:187
tending and refinancing the consumer. This would tend, for short
periods, to stabilize the financial condition of consumer customers in
times of general recession or where an unexpected personal crisis has
occurred. Second, by conditioning repossession upon compliance with
rudimentary procedural due process, the NCA insures the consumer
an opportunity to raise defenses in court before the property is taken.
By subjecting transferees and assignees of consumer paper to all de-
fenses arising from the original transaction, the NCA provides in-
creased substantive protection against third parties who finance retail
sellers. This protects the consumer against improper repossessions, and
forces the third-party purchaser of consumer paper to doublecheck
the reliability of any retail seller being financed. Third, in other than
"big ticket" transactions, the repossessing creditor must be satisfied
from the consumer goods in which a purchase money security interest
is created. No other property can be repossessed, and a deficiency judg-
ment is prohibited. Further, a straight suit on the monetary obligation
must proceed without confession of judgment or wage garnishment,
and the judgment lien attaches to less personal property than previ-
ously. Since these changes reduce both the availability of security in
and the feasibility of judicial enforcement of consumer transactions,
creditors would seemingly be required to rely more upon the proba-
bility that consumers will voluntarily meet their obligations in full.
Finally, a potentially powerful mix of public and private remedies
promises that creditor violations may be more easily detected, re-
dressed, and deterred. In short, the fangs have been removed from
the vicious cycle.
Since the NCA requires legislative enactment, how should the con-
scientious legislator react to this reform approach? While his ultimate
vote will be influenced by personal values, perspectives about consumer
protection, and political realities, a series of empirical questions should
first be asked and, hopefully, answered.
Initially, it is important to know whether the proposed legislation is
responsive to a fair quantum of real rather than imaginary abuses. For
example, do creditors in fact accelerate obligations for trivial defaults
so infrequently that the proposal advocates a solution for which there
is no problem?"0 The general absence of data on these questions is
80 Determining whether there is in fact a problem of substance is thought to be an
important objective of empirical research. See Dunham, Empiricism, Law Reform and
Consumer Protection, 23 J. LEAL, ED. 153, 159 (1970).
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xeinforced in Virginia by the almost total lack of reported consumer
protection litigation.81 The temptation to conclude that the absence
of empirical data suggests that all is well, however, should be resisted
until lower court files, state agencies charged with consumer protection,
and legal aid lawyers have been consulted. Apparent silence in a low
visibility arena with a high potential for abuse should be viewed with
the suspicion normally generated by uncertainty. Nevertheless, what
and how much abuse will always be difficult to quantify.
Next, assuming that real abuses exist in sufficient quantity for concern,
the legislator must ask whether the NCA is likely to control them and,
if so, will the impact costs, in the long run, exceed the projected gains
in efficiency and social welfare? The short answer is that no one can
tell for sure, although a more sophisticated model for analysis and assess-
ment may soon be available.82 At this point, opponents of NCA type
reform will invariably point out what economic theory predicts and
impact research generally confirms: regulation of this sort will, in
varying degrees, increase business costs that will, in turn, increase the
cost and decrease the supply of consumer credit. 8r This, it is argued,
is bad for the consumer, the economy 84 and, of course, the credit in-
81 An exception which offers little consolation to the consumer is Marshall v. Murray
Oldsmobile Co, 207 Va. 972, 154 S.E.2d 140 (1967). A recent study of Virginia courts
sheds no light on the quantity and nature of consumer credit litigation in the lower
courts. See Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REv. 3
(1971).
82This model is developed by Professor George J. Wallace of the University of
Iowa College of Law in an article entitled, Toward a New Approach to Default-A
Model of Constructive Credit Reform, scheduled for Fall, 1972 publication in the Yale
Law Journal.
83 See Comment, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimi-
nation of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE LJ. 618 (1969). The Yale
study is discussed in Dunham, supra note 80 at 156-57, and its methodology is criticized
in Shuchman, Empirical Studies in Commercial Law, 23 J. LEGAL ED. 181, 183-84 (1970).
See also, Shay, The Impact of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code Upon the Market for
Consumer Installment Credit, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 752, 761-63 (1968). On the
utility of economic analysis in this area, see C. SHAw, THE ECONOMICS OF -m Guriro
15-23 (1970); Olley, Economic Methodology in the Search for Consumer Justice, 23
J. LEGAL ED. 170 (1970).
84 In this regard, Professor Kripke's articles repay careful study. Kripke, Gesture
and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1 (1969); Kriple, Con-
sumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 CoLuM L. REv. 445 (1968).
See also High, Consumer Credit Regulation in Texas-A Rejoinder by an Economist,
50 Tax. L. REv. 463 (1972); Leary, Random Reflections on Remedies and Collections
in the Consumer Credit Field, 19 AM. U.L. Rav. 189 (1971); Rothschild, Conswner
Protection at Last through Local Control of Retail Installment Sales Contracts, 37 GEo.
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dustry. At the same time, disagreement over the goals of reform is
certain to appear. Should the proposed reform seek simply to realign
power within the free market framework or to impose tight controls
on credit volume and price? Should the proposed reform put top
priority on "stamping out" unethical practices, preventing default,'
minimizing the stress imposed upon consumers by the collection process,
or what? The predicates of "hard core" economics, conflicting values',
and the uncertainties produced by inadequate information are almost
more than the system can bear.
Many legislators, therefore, are likely to search for apparently bal-
anced solutions that minimize what we might call experimenting in
the dark."6 The temptation is to embrace the compromises worked'out
by private decision-makers in uniform legislation, such as the UCCC,
especially when these proposals improve the position of the consumer
in the particular state involved. In the alternative, one might opt for
specialized responses to particular problems rather than comprehensive
package deals that restructure the credit market. When these programs
are coupled with continued efforts to improve consumer access to the
legal system,8 7 increase the flow of information,"" maintain the "war"
on poverty, and encourage the courts to perform creative, interstitial
roles,su a healthier consumer credit market will probably result.
WASH. L. REV. 1067, 1098-115 (1969); Wenk & Moye, Debtor-Creditor Remedies: A
New Proposal, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 249 (1969).
85 In Great Britain, the Crowther Report concluded that "the basic principle of social
policy must . . . be to reduce the number of defaulting debtors . . ." and within "a
general policy of giving the consumer credit industry as much freedom as possible in
the conduct of its affairs" specific regulation would be acceptable "if it could be shown
that it would reduce the incidence of defaults." REPORT OF THE COMMATTEE, CONSUMER
CREDIT 151 (1971).86 Two recent and relevant empirical studies are White & Munger, Consumer Sensi-
tivity to Interest Rates: An Empirical Study of New-Car Buyers and Auto Loans, 69
MicH. L. REV. 1207 (1971) (disclosure has little impact upon buying behavior); Shuch-
man, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and Resale, 22
STAN. L. Rv. 20 (1969) (availability of deficiency remedy impairs creditor incentive
to obtain best price on disposition). For discussion of empirical studies in commercial
law, see Shuchman, supra note 83; Wallace, Book Review, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 404, 415-20
(1971).87 See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. 281 (1971); Comment, Extrajudicial Consumer Pressure: An Effec-
tive Impediment to Unethical Business Practices, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1011 (1969).
I 88See Leff, Injury, Ignorance and Spite-The Dynamics of Coercive Collection, 80
YAE L.J. 1, 36-46 (1970) (importance of information about collection to creditor).": 89 E.g., Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971). See also Javins v. First
Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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Still, a nagging question remains. Is the UCCC a "cop-out" where
the vicious cycle is concerned? Should the uncertainties produced by
inadequate data concerning the amount of abuse or the impact of NCA-
type reform be sufficient to justify inaction or to compel a compro-
mise that leaves much of the potential for abuse intact? Despite the
current spirit of "consumerism," a fundamental imbalance of power
still exists. Creditors normally have more than consumers, whether in
individual transactions, access to the legal system, traditional doctrines
of contract law, or lobbying in the legislative halls90 If these profes-
sionals, with superior power to shape and enforce the transaction and
to influence the legislative-administrative process, are also able to block
comprehensive reform simply by raising the spectre of uncertainty,
little progress can be expected. If the legislative burden is consistently
placed upon consumers to show by persuasive evidence that serious
abuses do exist and that the proposed reform will not create more
problems than it solves, the potential for other than compromise reform
is severely reduced.
The conscientious and courageous legislator, however, can equalize
to some extent this power imbalance. If there is evidence that some
creditor abuses exist in the cycle and the proposed legislation is respon-
sive to these abuses, the legislator can insist that those segments of the
credit industry affected produce data to show that the alleged abuses
are in fact insubstantial or are justified in terms of legitimate business
risks or fairness to the consumer. Put another way, the subjects of
regulation should be required to play a major part in allaying the
suspicion caused by factual uncertainties." Data on the exercise of
restraint in triggering the cycle, the incidence of repossession where
defenses are involved, and the use of deficiency judgment would, for
90 It has been stated that consumers need greater access to power, not more infor-
mation. Schooler, The Consuner Interest-the Real Issue, 1 J. CoNs. AFFAmS 34 (1967).
91Similarly, it has been stated that a professional seller, when charged with what
amounts to a prima facie unconscionable term or practice, has the ultimate burden in
litigation of justifying the term or practice as commercially reasonable. Zuckman,
Walker-Thomas Strikes Back: Comment on the Pleading and Proof of Price Uncon-
scionability, 30 FED. B.J. 308 (1971); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Conswner
Protection, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 359 (1970). Cf. Michelman, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J.
647, 684-85 (1971) (parties involved in conduct complained of bear heavy responsibility
to reduce the costs of uncertainty). A classic example of the difficulties posed when
data is, as yet, inadequate and the party seeking reform bears the burden of justifica-
tion is found in the movement to change the Marijuana laws. See Bonnie & Whitebread,
The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History
of American Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971, 1125-55 (1970).
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example, be critical to sound evaluations. Vague allegations concern-
ing the impact costs of reform should, therefore, be supported by the
professionals rather than left to the consumer for rebuttal. As a class,
they are in the best position to assume this burden, just as they are in
the best position to calculate and provide for business risks at the time
credit is extended.
We should not pretend that better data will answer the ultimate
questions posed by the consumer credit reform movement. At best, it
will illuminate the issues and better inform judgment on whether the
NCA or something less is appropriate reform for any particular time
and place. At worst, it could be a costly exercise in futility. But if law
is to be evaluated by what it seeks to accomplish for individual con-
sumers, 2 the NCA makes important strides in the right direction."
Frequently, spirit rather than intellect will provide the critical catalyst
for change. If affected creditors are given a full opportunity to allay
suspicion and reduce uncertainty in the legislative process, the cost of
experimentation should not be excessive. This is particularly true if
legislatures are prepared to adjust experiments in the light of experience.
Conceding the difficulty of the factual and value questions involved,
at some point the conscientious legislator, sensing the need for change,
will echo the words of the California Supreme Court:
If any hardship results from the rule we adopt, it is only that
hardship inherent in the insistence of the law that honesty and enter-
prise must also remain compatible. 94
92 See Cahn, Law in the Conszwmer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 14 (1963):
In the consumer perspective, the significance of any principle, rule, or concept,
however exalted, is investigated by observing the specific human targets of its
impacts and the occasions when it becomes material to concrete experiences of
the members of the community .... If legal philosophers would examine con-
cepts like freedom, truth, security, welfare, and sovereignty with a . . . sensi-
bility to human impacts, they might bring a bright new light to the law.93 Professor Barkly Clark has asserted that the NCA "goes too far" and has devised
a comprehensive statutory proposal somewhere between the UCCC and the NCA which
is designed to give the "consumer some relief without strangling the creditor"' Clark,
supra note 21 at 335-42. The new WiscoNsiN CONSUMER Acr, supra note 35, is a com-
prehensive legislative package with more roots in the NCA "first" final draft than the
UCCC.• 94 Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800, 825, 484 P.2d 964, 980, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796,
812 (1971).
